Evidence—Evidence of Speeding Provided by Untested Radar Equipment Sufficient if Corroborated by Qualified Observers by Buffalo Law Review
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 9 Number 1 Article 94 
10-1-1959 
Evidence—Evidence of Speeding Provided by Untested Radar 
Equipment Sufficient if Corroborated by Qualified Observers 
Buffalo Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Buffalo Law Review, Evidence—Evidence of Speeding Provided by Untested Radar Equipment Sufficient if 
Corroborated by Qualified Observers, 9 Buff. L. Rev. 161 (1959). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol9/iss1/94 
This The Court of Appeals Term is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an 
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
section of the Vehicle and Traffic Law appears to be eased by the instant
decision. The officers may now charge defendant directly on information,
relying upon facts within their knowledge to show "operation" circumstan-
tially, without having to procure another affiant to support a charge upon
information and belief.
EVIDENCE OF SPEEDING PROVIDED BY UNTESTED RADAR EQUIPMENT SUFFICIENT
IF CORROBORATED BY QUALIFIED OBSERVERS
Defendant's conviction in the City Court of Buffalo for speeding was
based on a radar meter reading, supported by the observations of two police-
men. One officer, looking through the rear view mirror of the radar car, ob-
served defendant's car for about 150 feet as it approached the field of the
radar beam. The other officer was stationed about one-tenth of a mile further
down the street. He watched defendant's vehicle as it passed the radar car
and approached him head on, until it stopped just short of his position.
The grounds of defendant's appeal were that (1) the evidence of the
radar meter reading was insufficient because there was no evidence to show
that the speedometer, against which the radar set had been tested, was itself
accurate and (2) the testimony of the policemen was insufficient because
neither of them had an adequate opportunity to observe the speed of the
defendant's car. On appeal the Supreme Court, Erie County, rejected both
the policemen's testimony and the radar reading as insufficient and reversed
the conviction without specifying whether its decision was on the law or on
the facts.
The Court of Appeals, considering the Supreme Court reversal as one on
the law alone,8 3 held that evidence of speeding provided by untested measur-
ing devices was admissable but insufficient, without more, to sustain a con-
viction, and that testimony of qualified observers could supply the deficiency
in proof. The testimony of the police officers was also held to be admissable
and sufficient to raise a question of fact as to defendant's speed. The case
was remitted to the appellate court for determination of that question.8 4
The Court declared this holding to be based squarely upon its recent
decisions in a radar meter case, People v. Magri,8 5 and two speedometer cases,
People v. Heyser"6 and People v. Marsellus.87 In all three cases convictions
based on police officers' estimates of defendant's speed which corroborated the
readings of untested devices were upheld. In Magri', one officer located at
the radar car and another about 800 to 1000 feet further down the road
observed defendant as he approached the radar car, passed through the radar
beam and continued down the road to the second officer's position. In
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Heyser8 9 a police officer followed defendant at a distance of 100 yards for
more than one-quarter of a mile. In Marsellus"' the officer followed defendant
for two miles.
In considering the present case, the court found the opportunity for
observation afforded the two police officers to be comparable to that found in
the cases just described. It is submitted that the facts of these four cases
demonstrate that there may be considerable latitude in defining the meaning
of "adequate opportunity for observation."
In a concurring opinion,9 ' Judge Van Voorhis deplored the majority's
departure from "the almost universal custom of Police and Justices' Courts,
' 2
which requires that speeding violations be established by speedometer or radar
readings rather than by observations of eyewitnesses "no matter how expert
they may be. ' 3 He pointed out that the need for supporting evidence would
be eliminated if the police were to make and keep records of regular tests of
measuring devices. Despite the appeal of this viewpoint to traffic courts and
motorists, it now appears to be well settled that readings of untested radar
equipment, if corroborated by testimony of policemen who have had an ade-
quate opportunity for observation, will be sufficient as a matter of law to sus-
tain a speeding conviction.
PRoor OF DAMAGE TO BAILED GOODS
Where a mutually beneficial bailment exists the bailee's duty is to
exercise reasonable workmanship upon the bailed goods.9 4 Upon completion
of the work the goods must be returned to the bailor reasonably fit for the
known use intended.95 If the goods are returned damaged and the bailor
shows they were not so damaged when bailed, a prima Jacie case is made out
against the bailee, 98 whereupon the bailee, if he is to escape liability, must
show reasonable care was used by him.Y7
In Aronette Mfg. Co. v. Capital Piece Dye Works, Inc.98 defendant
undertook to waterproof plaintiff's textiles after receiving them from a third
party which had subjected the textiles to a crease resisting process. Defendant
first sent three samples, which he had waterproofed, to the plaintiff for inspec-
tion. He also informed plaintiff that a few of the pieces when originally re-
ceived by defendant had an odor. Upon plaintiff's approval of the samples,
defendant waterproofed the rest of the textiles. When received by plaintiff,
the goods contained an odor. Upon assurance by defendant that the odor
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